It's like that old joke about robbing banks--you go where the money is. He is a good storyteller and his narration of the different economic histories of different parts of the world makes for absorbing reading. Typical rates of growth in output were certainly much slower than in most industrial economies today, and it has been suggested though not proved that pre-industrial capital goods were far less physically durable than they are now being made of different materials, and more completely exposed to the elements. It seems to have relatively different outcomes in different nations. What bugged me was the fact that the importance of culture in the behavior of groups is exquisitely difficult to prove in the present, under semi-controlled conditions, with relatively small numbers of people.
And here I would point to both technological developments in agriculture, in particular irrigation and the use of various techniques by which peasant farmers could get 5 or 6 harvests in two years from the same plot of land, and to organizational changes, in particular the development of a large, integrated, and efficient market for food grains, in particular rice. That is the old question raised by Adam Smith, Max Weber, and other titans of modern social thought. Nor was European distinctiveness simply a matter of guns, ships, and commerce, important as these things were. Communism, Distribution of wealth, Economics 1487 Words 4 Pages support for health and human services than most developed European nations. Therefore when I refer to the rich or the poor I define them as people with either a vast amount of assets or very little assets. Perhaps they shared the crucial medieval legacy of curiosity, inventiveness and multiple sources of initiative, or derived its equivalent from internal sources. The result has been truly tragic in Russia, and in much of Africa.
But behind those criticisms lay a dissatisfaction with some of the results. These techniques go back tens of thousands of years and account for the early dispersion of humanity from an African origin to colder climes. Finally, the common culture of Europeans was certainly not either very innovative, or very technological. It is striking to find that the iron-production technology changes very significantly from the 18th century on, gradually going from large-scale capital-intensive to small-scale labour-intensive. After its fall, no city, in Europe at least, would hit that threshold until London in 1811.
Andrew Porter, the Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at King's College, London, is the editor of ''The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume 3: The Nineteenth Century,'' to be published next year. A civilization like that of Poland can have a relatively low set-point if the second serfdom turns large proportions of the population into landless laborers with no incentive to delay nuptuality or diminish fertility. City, Philippines, Poverty 947 Words 3 Pages Wealth vs. The idea of barter, on the other hand, seems only to apply to limited exchanges between societies that had infrequent contact and often in a context of , rendering its conceptualisation among economists as a myth. Though to give Landes his due, Eurocentric doesn't mean triumphalist or apologist.
The Maratha tax system was the among the most sophisticated in the world, complete with field by field yearly surveys, written contracts and accounts, auditing and written apppeals processes. Landes's stress rests mostly on cultural factors--having to do with the fine workings of production, power, and prestige in the pre-industrial past--that gave European civilizations an edge over Chinese, Arabic, Indian, or Indonesian, in the speed of technological advance, that made it very likely that within Europe the breakthrough to industrialization would take place first in Britain, and that have made it damnably difficult since for people elsewhere to assimilate modern machine technologies and modes of social and economic organization. Au contraire to all of the above as the five stars rating hopefully tipped you off. Though marriage was early and nearly universal for Chinese women, fertility was limited within marriage by means known and unknown. Who, in other words, were these intellectually and culturally curious folks who gave us the European moment? As such the bullion-flows were a result of the class-relations within the countryside which is to argue Barry Pavier's overall point more vigorously. Contributed by Gregory Clark gclark ucdavis. The treasures of the country were unknown at the time of annexation, much of the landgrabbing was strategic so discoveries were happy surprises.
A business, by definition, is any activity that provides goods and services in an effort to earn a profit. . It poses a particular problem wherever people work in water--in wet rice cultivation, for example. While publishing his book, Smith. They see a point in making an effort. For the Mararthas, it was some time in the late seventeenth century.
Yet in saying these things, Huntington was simply echoing the tradition of moral geography. So, it must have sucked to have gone through that long undertaking, right? A point for Gunder Frank is the failure of the industrial revolution to take root first in the Netherlands. For me it was a little bit disappointing. Americans believe in meritocracy, a level playing field, where people succeed based on talent and ability rather than wealth. Yet it would be a mistake to see geography as destiny. After nine years of extensive observations and personal experience, Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations that simply attacked government intervention in the economy. Natural endowments, including landscape, water, soils, minerals or climate, have been more or less important at different times, but they were never sufficient conditions: geography is not destiny.
I felt like a pinball slamming around from Paraguay to the Ming Dynasty to the Spice Islands I had problems with this book. As opposed to income, wealth is the assets minus the debts an individual has. By contrast, I find Landes's account of why Europe--rather than India, Islam, or China--to be very well laid out, and very convincing. However, their freedom seemed still to exceed that of the people who occupied land in the country. Neither country, by the way, developed a strong financial services sector. N9 But the problem of absolute, relative and world wide comparative wage costs - in entrepreneurial calculation as in our analysis of the same - is related also to local and regional problems of labor allocation. One that always pushes its way up the list is to finish reading half-read books.
It then developed by 1900 into racism and all our woe. The views developed a number of historical events seemed very partial to me. It punctures much scholarly pretension and demonstrates the poverty of economics uninformed by historical understanding. Did China just stagnate from 1800 to 1900, or did it actually regress in living standards? His unsurpassed survey of technological change and its consequences in Europe since 1750 The Unbound Prometheus remains the most important must-read book for serious students of the industrial revolution, and his other books as well are critical points-of-reference for those who seek to understand the economic processes that made our modern world. Why do I need this book? My guess is that markets were freer under empires, ceteris paribus, than under fragmented feudal semi-polities. I contended that this was the case moreoso, and Pomeranz 1997 that it was not so, in China than in Europe, although we agree that it probably was more unequal than either in India.