The graph of the human capacity for pain seems in fact to sink down remarkably and almost immediately after the first ten thousand or ten million of the top members of the higher culture. One needs memory because they need to be able to remember they made the promise. The Jews, slaves in Egypt for centuries, managed to turn the original, aristocratic morality on its head. If it couldn't, even in principle, be true, what possible value could it have as philosophy? But this mindset could easily lead someone to think of themselves as being, for instance, lazy, weak-willed and unable to change. To set prices, measure values, think up equivalencies, to exchange things—that preoccupied man's very first thinking to such a degree that in a certain sense it's what thinking is.
I wrote: It all ties to his fears of the last man as laid out in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. For psychology is once again on the path to the fundamental problems. It is produced within the slave morality by action and reaction against the noble morality. Nietzsche, however, may be using history as grounds for higher symbols, higher types. The entire history of ethnic fighting, victory, reconciliation, mergers—everything which comes before the final rank ordering of all the elements of a people in that great racial synthesis—is mirrored in the tangled genealogies of its gods, in the sagas of their fights, victories, and reconciliations.
The United States, which has one of the highest recidivism rates in the developed world, still relies on a punishment heavy prison system that uses small rooms, isolation, and physical labor to mete out justice to the convicted. He genuinely doesn't care whether or not there is a good argument out there for practice or belief x. In working out his perspective optics of cognition, Nietzsche built on contemporary developments in the theory of cognition—particularly the work of non-orthodox neo-Kantians like Friedrich Lange and positivists like Ernst Mach, who proposed naturalized, psychologically-based versions of the broad type of theory of cognition initially developed by Kant and Schopenhauer see Clark 1990; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Anderson 1998, 2002, 2005; Green 2002; Hill 2003; Hussain 2004. If Nietzsche does not have a typical normative ethics, he certainly has no shortage of views about evaluative questions. It means that the wanting will mostly link up with the attitudes explained his slave morality.
A Note on Some of Nietzsche's Common Themes Nietzsche is not a systems-building philosopher. While I do agree with Nietzsche in many ways, I also think he had a fair to harsh and cynical view of humanity. Gaby Silva From the start I find it interesting how Nietzsche opens up with the idea of a promise. It is rather the case that the wrong doer from now on is carefully protected by the community against this anger, particularly from that of the injured person, and is taken into protective custody. It is impossible to conclude that the work is not deliberately designed to be as offensive as possible to any earnest Christian believer. Although Nietzsche's illiberal attitudes for example, about human equality are apparent, there are no grounds for ascribing to him a political philosophy, since he has no systematic or even partly systematic views about the nature of state and society.
What I find cowardly is not so much the refusal to commit itself, but to employ such rhetorical tricks of refusing to say anything substantive enough to be attacked. I might have to reread the Genealogy yet again This is an attack on the Darwinian theory of evolution. Instead, Nietzsche's claim is that the dicta of the church need to be evaluated in terms of what their consequences are for humanity--what sorts of actions do they actually lead to? What matters is the stuff that's taught in Sunday School or recited in sermons--the lessons that are drilled into the head. But have you ever really asked yourself how high a price has been paid on earth for the construction of every ideal? I think it is also natural to punish ourselves, but since we continue to break morals and punish ourselves, society does need to step in. So much against this tendency in general.
But we might still offer alternatives. So, contrary to Foot, Nietzsche is not claiming that people are actually too altruistic and too egalitarian in their practice; he is worried that as a consequence of the slave revolt in morals, etc. Thus, theoretical claims not only need to be analyzed from the point of view of truth, but can also be diagnosed as symptoms and thereby traced back to the complex configurations of drive and affect from the point of view of which they make sense. But the idea that law or morality can represent any absolute good is absurd; the war of the wills still rages. It was as though a water-animal to avoid perishing became a land-animal which was expected to go on its own feet instead of simply being carried by the water, the abrupt change having the effect of unharnessing their instincts and rendering them worthless. Here, weakness is called merit, inability to revenge is called forgiving, suffering is called bliss, subjection is called obedience, the longing for retaliation is called longing for justice, and the inability to create a better life here is assuaged with the claim that there is a better life after this one.
That emotion motivated the development of the new moral concept , purpose-designed for the moralistic condemnation of those enemies. He may say that absolute truth is impossible, but he certainly acts like it is very possible, and he's very fond of making claims that certainly sound absolute. So lots of people think that he has pretty clear views on freedom and on the nature of the self; Brian Leiter thinks he has pretty clear views on free will, the nature of epistemic warrant, the efficacy of the mental, and more; Paul Katsafanas thinks he has pretty clear views about the nature of normativity and about agency; the list goes on. Nietzsche, however, must reject this notion. It's that kind of attitude I find baffling. That would require getting acclimatized to keen, high air, winter wanderings, to ice and mountains in every sense. However, I fail to see what is so detestable about an institution or belief that is designed to uplift individuals, who do not adhere to what Nietzsche describes as good morality strong, creative, motivated, etc.
I haven't looked in depth for criticisms of Nietzsche, and so cannot really answer the question either, but I'm also willing to try and respond to your complaints if you're uninterested in that, feel free to ignore the post. This seems like a rather absurd false dilemma. Up to this point I have deliberately set aside the actual moralizing of these ideas the repression of them into the conscience, or more precisely, the complex interaction between a bad conscience and the idea of god. If everything is perspective and opinion, who cares? It is clear that both types of conscience serve the purpose of evaluating situations, but it is their origin that determines the validity of their judgments. I found myself especially connecting to his idea that the act of remembering has a direct relation to pain.
Now, in his defense, I might buy that Christianity, its more vulgar forms, might take on that appearance, but I would not say that the core, actual doctrine is of that nature. I partially disagree with him, but it's a good exploration of how Nietzsche could write philosophy given his perspectivism and focuses on his style of writing. Noble ideals grew organically out of the life experiences of nobles, their victories and opportunities for adventure and prowess; but slave ideals had to be manufactured synthetically out of resentful misery and frustration. The notion of conscience has often been used to buttress the validity of morality, and even the existence of God. He only denigrates the idea tha philosophy is a rational, disinterested investigation of things, and also he denigrates philosophers who try to emulate scientists with their indifference to values. This, of course, is essentially Nietzsche's view as well. But most accounts of Nietzsche's personality indicate that he was a compassionate and helpful if also somewhat socially challenged person.
Nietzsche appeals to this notion of indebtedness in his explanation of the development of guilt, by referring to the perceived indebtedness towards ancestors and gods. What can people give back to them? That it is a vengeful religion, hoping to exact judgement over the ruling classes of history. I suppose that is true, because I think this analysis is completely wrong. The priestly ascetics, the saints, consider themselves alone the good and just. He is rather saying our ethics is misleading. It is seen as a debtor creditor relationship with themselves.